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ELEVATOR PITCH  
Although small and medium enterprises represent more than 90% of all enterprises and play 
an important role in employment generation, they lack access to affordable formal finance. 
Conventionally, market failures and information imperfections are seen as major causes of 
this misallocation. However, the role of social and political factors in resource allocation, 
including access to formal finance, has recently become more widely accepted. Firm level 
evidence from post-communist economies, for example, shows that political connectedness 
improves access to bank credit, but is not associated with enterprise growth.Graphical 
Abstract: Small and medium enterprises’ use of formal credit remains low  
  
Source: Based on the most recent Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) data (EBRD, 2017. Online at: http://ebrd-beeps.com/). 
Note: * Includes Georgia. Turkmenistan is not included due to data limitations. 
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 Access to formal finance is skewed against small and medium enterprises in favor of 
large firms. 
 Market failures and information imperfections do not fully explain why the 
distribution of formal finance is skewed against smaller enterprises. 
 Political connections play an important role in gaining access to formal finance. 
 Evidence shows that formal financing is associated with faster firm growth than 
informal financing, and smaller enterprises benefit more from improved access. 
 
Cons  
 Recent data shows that substantial portions of small and medium enterprises in post-
communist countries offer bribes to public officials relatively frequently. 
 Political connectedness exacerbates misallocation of formal finance, often in favor of 
enterprises with closer links to government officials, which are usually larger and 
wealthier. 
 Most recent country-level case studies find that although political connectedness 
improves firms’ access to formal finance, the practice is not positively associated with 
firm performance and growth. 
 
 
AUTHORS MAIN MESSAGE 
Unequal distribution of formal finance between large and small enterprises has traditionally 
been explained by market failures and information imperfections, prompting policy 
intervention to increase the flow of bank finance to small and medium enterprises. But, 
interpersonal political connectedness exacerbates this misallocation further, often in favor of 
enterprises with links to government officials. Traditional policy measures should thus be 
complemented with reforms to improve the transparent and impartial functioning of 
bureaucratic institutions, whose ultimate goal should be to facilitate, not hinder, market-based 
exchanges.   
 
MOTIVATION 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in market economies in terms 
of employment generation and poverty reduction, as they often operate in labor-intensive 
stages of the production chain. Most SMEs, however, do not grow beyond some minimum 
efficiency scale due to various external factors, including lack of access to adequately priced 
external finance. The situation is made worse by the persistency of corrupt practices linked to 
bureaucratic institutions. Among all sources of external finance, SMEs rely most heavily on 
bank credit generally in both advanced and emerging economies. Yet, according to firm level 
data for 2012-14 (see the illustration on page 1), SMEs in post-communist economies remain 
heavily dependent on internal finance and the share of financing available from banks is only 
comparable to that offered by suppliers, i.e. trade credit. In addition, although most SMEs 
have bank accounts, and around 40% in Eastern Europe and 20% in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) report having access to formal finance, about one-fifth of SMEs 
complain that lack of external finance is a major to very severe problem for their operation 
and growth (Figure 1). Further, 22% of SMEs in Eastern Europe and 36% in the CIS report 
having offered some bribes and gifts to public officials.  
Figure 1: SME access to finance and frequency of bribing in post-communist economies 
 
Source: Based on the most recent Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) data (EBRD, 2017. Online at: http://ebrd-beeps.com/). 
Note: * Includes Georgia. Turkmenistan is not included due to data limitations. 
 
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS 
Enterprise finance in transition economies: a background 
Although more than 25 years have passed since the start of market-oriented reforms in the 
post-communist economies of Eastern Europe and the CIS, some of the ongoing problems in 
enterprise access to formal finance can be traced to the central planning and transitionary 
reform periods. While the focus here is on Eastern Europe and the CIS, conclusions can 
easily be extended to other large transition economies such as China and Vietnam. 
At the start of their transformations towards market-based economic systems in the late 
1980s, post-communist economies had relatively similar conditions, especially in relation to 
their monetary systems, banking structures, and enterprise finances. For example, compared 
to currency in capitalist societies, which is a generally accepted universal title for all tradable 
goods and services, under central planning, currency could be used only for specific purposes 
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as determined by authorities. Extra cash holdings of profitable enterprises, therefore, did not 
have independent purchasing power. This created strong incentives for enterprise managers to 
establish interpersonal relationships with public officials, who, by default, were affiliated 
with the communist party, to gain access to important scarce resources. As will be discussed 
later, the impact of interpersonal political connections on resource allocation only grew 
stronger in the post-transition period.  
In terms of finance, the monobank system, which combined commercial and central banking, 
financed around 50% of enterprise working capital, while long-term fixed capital investments 
were funded by non-repayable government grants [1]. This phenomenon, also known as ‘soft 
budget constraints’, was one of the main criticisms of central planning, as it allowed loss-
making enterprises to stay afloat. Reducing enterprise over-dependence on monobank finance 
was thus one of the key policy challenges in the early years of transition. This was meant to 
be achieved by dividing the monobank system into a market-based, two-tiered banking 
system consisting of a central bank and commercial banks. As in successful market 
economies, the central bank would provide effective prudential regulation and supervision of 
commercial banks, which, in turn, would impose financial discipline on enterprises, thereby 
ensuring a more efficient allocation of resources. 
In reality, however, persistent inflation and the associated macroeconomic instability in the 
early 1990s adversely affected the general public’s trust in the banking system and, 
subsequently, the banks’ ability to intermediate between savers and borrowers. More 
importantly, because inflation eroded the real value of business deposits and simultaneously 
increased the nominal value of payments under contractual obligations, it ended up making 
enterprises more dependent upon external finance, thus putting strain on interenterprise 
payments. As a consequence, the sudden and sharp reduction in bank credit, partly the direct 
outcome of purposeful policies designed to 'harden' the soft budget constraints, resulted in 
enterprises resorting to alternative means of financing their working capital. Bartering, 
transactions in promissory notes, inter-enterprise arrears, and mutual debt write-offs were 
observed in almost all transition economies in the late 1990s, but were most severe in Russia 
and Ukraine where, at its peak in 1998, barter accounted for more than 50% of all industrial 
transactions [1]. 
Foreign ownership of banks was also viewed as instrumental in bank restructuring, and was 
highly encouraged by policy advisors. It was expected that foreign banks would bring market 
expertise and efficient corporate governance, boost competition and improve efficiency in the 
financial services industry, and ultimately increase the supply of loans to the enterprise 
sector, including to SMEs. Contrary to expectations, however, foreign banks were more 
actively involved in lending to households, which requires relatively less sophistication and 
expertise compared to lending to businesses [1].  
Hence, enterprises in post-communist economies faced severe credit shortages in the 1990s, 
and the foreign-currency-fueled credit boom of the 2000s also eluded them. As a result, a 
large proportion of SMEs in post-communist countries remain credit constrained, which 
holds implications for their future operation and growth. 
The distribution of formal finance is skewed against SMEs  
While acknowledging the size and significance of SMEs in market economies, it is also 
important to note that some SMEs don't have growth aspirations by default, as they may be 
set up simply to avoid unemployment, and their number thus fluctuates with business cycles 
[2]. Nevertheless, a large proportion of SMEs are aspirational in the sense that they are 
established to pursue profitable opportunities and to grow in size; these are known as 
transformational SMEs. Although a small number of innovative high growth SMEs create 
most of the new jobs, a majority of transformational SMEs do not  reach their optimum size 
due to various external constraints including inadequate access to formal finance. 
Access to adequately priced formal finance is of paramount importance to SMEs' smooth 
operation and growth. Enterprise complaints about poor financial access are higher in 
emerging economies where almost one-third of enterprises cite lack of external finance as 
either the main or a severe obstacle to their operation. Bank financing of SME activities 
remains low in transition economies too. According to the most recent enterprise survey 
results, as shown in the illustration on page 1, SMEs were able to finance only 9% of their 
working capital needs in the CIS and 14% in Eastern Europe through bank loans, which is 
quite low compared to the pre-transition figure of 50%.  
As Figure 2 shows, most CIS countries are less developed financially, and have lower per 
capita income levels compared to their Eastern European counterparts, which may partly 
explain the observed difference in access to finance between the CIS and Eastern Europe 
regions. An important caveat, however, is that these aggregate indicators are rather broad and 
do not fully reflect the more specific institutional and financial constraints the SME sector 
faces. For example, although there is rich evidence for a strong positive correlation between 
financial development and economic growth, this does not necessarily imply causation. 
While more developed financial systems generally offer better access to financial services, 
aggregate measures of financial development, such as private sector credits, broad money, 
banking sector assets, etc. do not provide enough information about the breadth and quality of 
financial depth. Moreover, they neglect, for example, the proportion of SMEs responsible for 
the utilization of available formal finance [2].  
Figure 2: Measures of Financial Depth and Per Capita Income in 2013  
 
 Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015. Online at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).  
 
From all available sources of external finance, SMEs depend most heavily on bank loans. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that financing from formal, rather than informal, financial 
institutions is associated with faster firm growth, and smaller enterprises benefit more from 
the improved availability of bank finance [2]. In principle, banks should finance all projects 
with positive net present value independent of firm size. But, in practice, the distribution of 
formal finance is skewed against SMEs, which must also pay higher costs on loans. 
The classical explanation of the unequal distribution of finance, which provides a strong 
rationale for policy intervention in credit markets, highlights market failures as the main 
underlying cause of misallocation [3]. Market failures occur as a result of information 
imperfections, which arise for a number of reasons. For example, SMEs are usually younger 
and less likely to possess acceptable collateral. They are informationally more opaque and 
face stiffer competition in product markets, which, in turn, affects the predictability of cash 
flow forecasting. Because SMEs are not scaled down versions of large enterprises, lending to 
them is seen by banks as high risk. This, the argument goes, explains the lower supply and 
higher cost of bank lending to SMEs [4]. 
Political connectedness matters in the allocation of formal finance 
An emerging body of literature that draws on institutional economics highlights the role of 
interpersonal social and political factors in explaining the asymmetric distribution of formal 
finance across enterprises of varying size [5], [6], [7]. According to this view, entrepreneurial 
decisions concerning investment, production, and exchange will respond not only to market 
prices, but also to rules and regulations that can jointly shape incentivizing and hindering 
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mechanisms such as permits, fiscal concessions, preferential access to resources etc. 
Exchanges taking place through anonymous markets are the most desirable, but the efficiency 
of resource allocation, including that of formal finance, is largely dependent upon the 
credibility and effectiveness of bureaucratic organizations, which facilitate the process of 
exchange, production, and investment by enforcing rules, regulations, and contracts [8].  
Bureaucratic institutions in underdeveloped markets usually lack credibility, which causes 
inefficiencies by hindering market-based incentivizing and constraining mechanisms. 
Consequently, the role of bureaucratic institutions is partly replaced by community-ruled 
horizontal webs of interpersonal networks that can grow in importance when it comes to 
production and exchange relations. This, in turn, will result in the emergence of a network of 
exclusive interpersonal and reputation-based relations to resolve allocative and redistributive 
questions, including access to formal finance [9]. 
Hence, influential political players can and do affect economic outcomes, including the 
distribution of formal finance, both formally through red tape and informally through 
individual connections and interpersonal relations. Entrenched political elites may influence 
business environments by adopting formal rules and regulations to protect their rent-seeking 
interests and create unfavorable operational constraints and obstacles for other enterprises. 
This can result in a culture of favoritism and bribery, which further suppresses impersonal 
market-based exchange and resource allocation. Because larger enterprises are more 
established and have more resources at their disposal to establish economically beneficial 
connections, smaller firms suffer more from these constraints.  
Figure 3 shows the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indices for 
banking and enterprise reforms in post-communist economies. Each index ranges from 1 to 
4.3, where 1 represents no or little change from a centrally planned economy and 4.3 
represents a standard typical of an advanced market economy. As seen in Figure 3, the 
assessment of banking and enterprise reforms varies across the countries, with the Eastern 
European countries generally demonstrating better institutional reform progress in both areas.  
Figure 3: Banking & Enterprise Reform in Post-Communist Economies in 2010 
 
 Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2011. Online at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/transition-report) 
Note: The indices range from 1 to 4.3. 1 represents no or little change from a centrally 
planned economy and 4.3 represents a standard typical of advanced market economies. 
 
Although most Eastern European countries might have adopted the best pro-market rules and 
regulations from advanced market economies, these do not immediately, or necessarily, 
translate into transparent and credibly functioning bureaucratic institutions. More 
importantly, despite the intensification of market-based exchanges and improved credibility 
of formal bureaucratic organizations in most post-communist economies, evidence suggests 
that public officials and civil servants still personalize their positions by using the rigidity of 
rules and regulations as an excuse for rent-seeking [10]. Moreover, according to the most 
recent enterprise survey data presented in Figure 1, more than one fifth of the SMEs in 
Eastern Europe and more than one third in the CIS reported relatively frequent offering of 
bribes to public officials.  
There is growing empirical evidence to suggest that political connections play an important 
role in gaining access to formal finance [5], [6], [11], [12]. The most popular measures of 
political connectedness in these empirical studies include, among others, the proportion of top 
managers’ time spent with public officials, lobbying, frequency of offering bribes and gifts to 
public officials, holding government contracts, and whether or not top managers’ friends 
and/or family members work at government institutions. Despite their variability, all of these 
proxies have one thing in common: they attempt to measure firms’ interpersonal 
connectedness with public officials in bureaucratic institutions.  
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Although econometric studies investigating the link between political connectedness and 
SME access to finance have only recently emerged, the available evidence clearly and 
unambiguously indicates that political connectedness affects the distribution of formal 
finance, and that larger and wealthier enterprises benefit the most from such links. For 
example, using primary survey data, a case study of SMEs in Uzbekistan found that fewer 
SMEs with government connections expressed a need for external finance, but they were 
more likely to apply for bank credit and the application success rate was around 20 percent 
higher for politically connected SMEs [5]. Other country-level case studies from Vietnam, 
Slovenia, and China also found that political connectedness affected the distribution of 
formal finance [6], [11], [12]. A recent cross-country study, based on around 14,000 SME 
responses from 28 post-communist economies, also demonstrates that: i) the use of 
interpersonal bureaucratic networks improves the chances of receiving bank credit by up to 8 
percent and ii) the small share of available SME credit is distributed in favor of those 
enterprises that capitalize on bureaucratic links. Looking at regional variation among the 
results, the study also found that interpersonal connectedness mattered most when formal 
credit was in relatively short supply, and the benefits of interpersonal links were stronger for 
older, wealthier, and larger SMEs [13].  
Political connectedness and allocative efficiency  
Alternative views exist on the influence and ultimate impact of corrupt political 
connectedness on allocative efficiency and social welfare, which is a key policy question. 
According to one line of reasoning, the impact of corruption on allocative efficiency can be 
positive-the ‘helping hand’ perspective. For example, under imperfect market conditions and 
limited rule of law, entrepreneurs may consciously and actively look for government 
connections hoping to gain access to resources and/or to ease various business constraints. 
This can then incentivize public officials to act as de-facto stakeholders in businesses rather 
than “short-term bribe-takers”, resulting in the adoption and implementation of business-
friendly regulations, hence fostering growth prospects. In addition, firms that can afford to 
offer (highest) bribes to gain access to scarce resources are also likely to be more successful 
enterprises, which ultimately results in socially beneficial outcomes [6], [10]. 
Critics, however, point out that this view ignores the necessarily interpersonal nature of 
relations between public officials and entrepreneurs, especially when bureaucratic 
organizations do not enjoy full credibility. They argue that interpersonal networks are used 
more often when rent seeking behavior is prevalent, rules and laws are dysfunctional, and 
anonymous markets are suppressed-the ‘grabbing hand’ perspective [9]. Although 
interpersonal links require some form of eventual pecuniary reward in exchange for favors, 
non-pecuniary obligations are likely to dominate, as these can be recurrent and produce 
continuous benefits to both parties. Further, soliciting bribes is not costless for corrupt 
officials, even under these circumstances: there is always a danger that they may be caught in 
the process, implying that bureaucrats are more likely to cooperate with people they trust to 
minimize the risk of being caught [9], [10]. Therefore, having the right interpersonal 
connections becomes more valuable than simply affording explicit monetary payments as 
bribes. 
There is limited evidence for the ‘helping hand’ version of the conjecture, and it is specific 
only to China, where administrative reforms in the 1990s allowed government officials to 
quit bureaucracy and join the business sector. This particular policy incentivized bureaucrats 
to implement pro-growth reforms in China. In contrast, the list of studies finding evidence for 
the ‘grabbing hand’ version of the argument is too long to list here. But, it suffices to refer to 
the most recent country-level case studies from countries such as Slovenia, Vietnam, and 
Uzbekistan, all of which find that although political connectedness improves firms’ access to 
formal finance, the practice is not positively associated with firm performance and growth.  
The implication is that not all entrepreneurs are fortunate enough to have economically 
beneficial interpersonal connections with people in power, and the most valuable of such 
networks can also be the most exclusive. In addition, belonging to a single network may open 
access to other networks, as some entrepreneurs will be members of multiple networks. For 
example, entrepreneurs may gain indirect access to formal finance through their connections 
with government officials who network with other resource holders including bankers. The 
interpersonal and exclusive natures of such networks imply that a small number of 
strategically well-connected entrepreneurs will be able to seize a disproportionately large 
share of common resources and opportunities, which can result in further allocative 
inefficiencies. Hence, corrupt practices by official bureaucrats cannot be justified, as they 
rely on insider-outsider distinctions and suffocate equality of opportunities. They are, 
therefore, not only economically costly but may also be morally repugnant [13]. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS 
Although the emerging literature on political connectedness provides a vital contribution to 
the understanding of the key factors that lead to the asymmetric distribution of formal finance 
across enterprises of varying size and political influence, there remains some important 
limitations and gaps. First of all, despite the fact that financial development is closely 
associated with economic growth and the strength of this correlation depends on underlying 
institutional differences, such as the effectiveness of contract enforcement and creditor 
protection laws, the observed empirical relationship between the two variables does not 
necessarily imply causation. Indeed, lack of formal finance is not the only constraining 
factors in SME growth, which also depends on owners' growth aspirations, market failures, 
policy, and other institutional factors.  
Second, some political connections are more valuable than others and further research is 
needed to account for this more adequately. And finally, notwithstanding the existing strong 
consensus about the positive impacts of improving the transparency, impartiality, and 
predictability of bureaucratic institutions on the efficiency of market exchanges in general, 
and the resource allocation process in particular, it is not easy to measure the process 
precisely for policy purposes. 
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE  
SMEs play an important role in terms of employment generation, poverty reduction, and 
contribution to economic growth. But, SMEs often lack adequate access to appropriately-
priced formal finance, which constrains their operation and growth. Traditional explanations 
for the unequal distribution of finance focus on market and information imperfections. A 
more recent approach adds an additional dimension to this phenomenon by highlighting the 
role of institutional and political factors in the economic process. When bureaucratic 
institutions lack credibility and rules and laws are dysfunctional, rent-seeking behavior 
becomes prevalent as agents try to profit from the web of interpersonal relations. Growing 
evidence suggests that political connections play an important role in gaining access to 
formal finance, further exacerbating the misallocation of scare credit resources among SMEs. 
Traditional policy measures to improve the flow of formal finance to SMEs include both 
supply and demand side support schemes. For example, governments can offer various loan 
guarantee schemes to support lending to the SME sector, which allows SMEs to gain access 
to formal credit at cheaper rates. Governments can also offer tax breaks on bank profits 
earned in lending to the SME sector, thus incentivizing banks to lend more to SMEs. Also, 
most of the regional and international financial institutions, such as the EBRD and the Asian 
Development Bank, offer funds to local banks to be channeled specifically to SMEs. 
Although, in principle, these policies may improve the overall flow of formal finance to small 
and medium enterprises, which is debatable without appropriate empirical evidence, existing 
findings make a strong case against its equitable distribution amongst most creditworthy 
enterprises. The traditional measures, therefore, need to be complemented with decisive and 
credible reforms aimed at improving the transparency and impartiality of bureaucratic 
institutions in general, and eradicating corrupt and rent-seeking behavior by public office 
holders in particular. The reforms, for example, could include developing fair and 
competitive remuneration schemes for government employees, including establishing explicit 
meritocratic criteria to foster longer term career development planning, careful identification 
and credible punishment of corrupt officials, continuous professional development workshops 
aimed at raising awareness about the consequences of corruption etc. Without these reforms, 
entrepreneurs will not be incentivized to use prices, rules, and regulations as signals for 
decision making, and will instead rely on interpersonal connections with bureaucrats, thus 
continuing to perpetrate the misallocation of scarce credit resources. 
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